

CONFERENCE OF THE EIGHTEEN-NATION COMMITTEE
ON DISARMAMENT

ENDC/PV.307
22 June 1967
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THE UNIVERSITY
OF MICHIGAN

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FINAL VERBATIM RECORD OF THE THREE HUNDRED AND SEVENTH MEETING

held at the Palais des Nations, Geneva
on Thursday, 22 June 1967, at 10.30 a.m.

Chairman:

Mr. A.F. AZEREDO da SILVEIRA (Brazil)

GE.67-11395

67-18022

PRESENT AT THE TABLE

Brazil:

Mr. A.F. AZAREDO da SILVEIRA
Mr. C.A. de SOUZA e SILVA
Mr. S. de QUEIROZ DUARTE

Bulgaria:

Mr. K. CHRISTOV
Mr. B. KONSTANTINOV
Mr. T. DAMIANOV
Mr. D. KOSTOV

Burma:

U MAUNG MAUNG
U KYAW MIN

Canada:

Mr. E.L.M. BURNS
Mr. C.J. MARSHALL
Mr. J.R. MORDEN

Czechoslovakia:

Mr. P. WINKLER
Mr. V. VAJNAR

Ethiopia:

Mr. B. ASSFAW

India:

Mr. V.C. TRIVEDI
Mr. N. KRISHNAN
Mr. K.P. JAIN

Italy:

Mr. G.P. TOZZOLI
Mr. E. FRANCO
Mr. F. SORO

Mexico:

Mr. J. CASTANEDA
Mr. F. CORREA

Nigeria:

Alhaji SULE KOLO
Mr. B.O. TONWE

Poland:

Mr. J. GOLDBLAT
Mr. E. STANIEWSKI

Romania:

Mr. O. IONESCO
Mr. C. GEORGESCU
Mr. A. COROIANU
Mr. M. BUHOARA

Sweden:

Mr. H. EWERLÖF
Mr. R. BOMAN

Union of Soviet Socialist
Republics:

Mr. A.A. ROSCHIN
Mr. V.P. SUSLOV
Mr. I.M. PALENYKH

United Arab Republic:

Mr. H. KHALLAF
Mr. A. OSMAN

United Kingdom:

The Rt. Hon. F. MULLEY
Mr. I.F. PORTER
Mr. R.I.T. CROMARTIE
Mr. R.J. O'NEILL

United States of America:

Mr. W.C. FOSTER
Mr. G. BUNN
Mr. C.G. BREAN
Mr. C. GLEYSTEN

Special Representative of the
Secretary-General:

Mr. D. PROTITCH

Deputy Special Representative
of the Secretary-General:

Mr. W. EPSTEIN

1. The CHAIRMAN (Brazil): I declare open the three hundred and seventh plenary meeting of the Conference of the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament.
2. I have on my list of speakers for today the representative of the United Kingdom, but before giving him the floor I would like to avail myself of this opportunity to extend, in the name of the Brazilian delegation, a very warm welcome to the new leader of the United Kingdom delegation, the Rt. Hon. Fred Mulley. I am sure that under his guidance the United Kingdom delegation will continue to make in our Committee the outstanding contribution which it has always made in the past.
3. Mr. MULLEY (United Kingdom): I should like first of all, Mr. Chairman, to thank you for your very kind words of welcome, and I will certainly do what I can to live up to the requirements of the very considerable task which has been given to me.
4. Since I assumed responsibilities for disarmament as leader of the United Kingdom delegation I have studied the proceedings of this Conference with great interest. My own previous experience in international negotiations has been with problems of a rather different kind. Sometimes the subject matter has been complex, but the aims of the exercise have been limited and precise: and one of the aims has been to reach agreement within a reasonable time if possible. If conditions for agreement are found not to exist, you pack up and go home. But the matters with which we are here engaged are so vital to the peace and security of the whole world that we can never pack up and we cannot go home -- let alone face the General Assembly next October -- until we have something to show for our labours.
5. Those not concerned with disarmament questions from day to day, as members of this Committee have been for so long, find it difficult to understand why so little progress has been made despite the great efforts devoted to disarmament here since this Committee began its work, in March 1962, and for many years before. I confess that, in participating for the first time in the field of disarmament and arms control negotiations, I approach my responsibilities with a feeling of some impatience at the slow rate of progress. I have, however, been advised to accumulate patience, and I will do my best.

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6. I said some years ago, in a book on the problems of defence in the modern world which I wrote in 1961, that disarmament was like a child learning to walk. The first few steps were the most difficult, but once the unusual posture had been mastered progress became more rapid as confidence increased. I had hoped that the partial test ban Treaty of 1963 (ENDC/100/Rev.1) would have provided the confidence to give greater progress and momentum, but obviously I was too optimistic, although I sense now that we are on the brink of possible achievement with the non-proliferation treaty. The next weeks will be very crucial.

7. Members will all be familiar with the words of the great English poet, William Shakespeare, which are always quoted on these occasions:

"There is a tide in the affairs of men,

Which, taken at the flood, leads on to fortune;"

but I think that his following lines, less frequently quoted, aptly describe the present situation:

"On such a full sea are we now afloat,

And we must take the current when it serves,

Or lose our ventures." (Julius Caesar, Act IV, Sc. 3)

8. Not only will an acceptable non-proliferation treaty be at risk if we go to New York empty-handed, but I believe all future progress towards general and complete disarmament will be prejudiced, for it seems to me that this treaty is essential, not only for itself but also as a vital step in the general direction in which we want to go.

9. Looking back for a moment at the beginnings of the movement to stop the spread of nuclear weapons to other States by means of a treaty, I am struck by the fact that the original formulation, in the famous Irish resolution of 1961 (A/RES/1665 (XVI)), was refreshingly simple. If it had been possible to get agreement then, much time and money spent on armaments might have been saved. From the first beginnings it has been the aim of the supporters of a non-proliferation treaty to get something agreed which could be a step in the process of control and abolition of nuclear weapons. Since then the matter has become more complicated.

10. I am well aware that control -- the problem of a safeguards formula and procedure -- remains the central difficulty. But I do not accept that it is insoluble. Given good will and a willingness to try to understand the problems of

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all the countries involved I am sure we can reach an agreement acceptable to non-nuclear and nuclear States alike. In short, I remain obstinately convinced of the need for understanding and the power of persuasion. However, this is perhaps not the only complication but one of many that have arisen since the simplicity of General Assembly resolution 1665 (XVI) stated so admirably the problem and the urgent need to solve it.

11. Today I should like to try to deal with two of the complications, the question of balance, and the effect a treaty on nuclear weapons would have on the peaceful uses of atomic energy.

12. In the original Irish resolution the balance was purely formal. But over the years, largely through the efforts of the Indian Government, the idea has grown up, and been accepted, that because a non-proliferation treaty would involve a greater obvious sacrifice for the non-nuclear-weapon Powers some quid pro quo must be exacted from the nuclear-weapon Powers in conjunction with the treaty, or even in the treaty itself. This is the great opportunity to force the nuclear-weapon Powers to get down to real disarmament. So the argument runs --- and no one who believes that without some real disarmament soon the risks of disaster increase can fail to applaud the motives behind it.

13. But of course the sacrifices involved in nuclear war, if and to whomever it should come, would not be limited to nuclear or non-nuclear, or to combatant or non-combatant. In seeking to limit the risks of nuclear war we are all on the same side. Further, I hope it is realized by all of us here that our present discussion of a treaty on the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons is in a real sense the essential precondition of further progress in reaching agreement on measures of disarmament or arms control by the nuclear Powers. If we cannot manage to agree on a non-proliferation treaty -- and that quite soon -- I fear that all the efforts of recent years may break down, and that all hope of progress on disarmament agreements may be lost as far ahead as we can see.

14. Therefore, if important non-nuclear-weapon States insisted on holding up a non-proliferation treaty until a decision had been taken on which measure of disarmament on the part of the nuclear Powers to implement next, they would not I believe succeed in forcing the great nuclear Powers to reach quick agreement.

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That needs more time. But time is not on our side over the present treaty. If even one more nuclear-weapon State emerges, the dam could burst. On a more mundane note, there is a danger that the momentum which we have painfully attained over the last year may be lost. The rest of the world may then get "fed up" with the apparently inconclusive meanderings of the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament and try to devise another meeting place and different participants. I have of course no vested interest in this Conference's continuation for its own sake. But the difficulties of setting up another and different kind of conference would take months if not years to resolve.

15. Of course, my delegation does not simply want to get just any non-proliferation treaty signed, regardless of its content. I have read with care the extremely lucid speech by the representative of Mexico at our meeting of 13 June, wherein he made some of the points I have made today in even blunter fashion. He went on to say:

"... a treaty would result in institutionalizing and perpetuating the division of the world into nuclear and non-nuclear Powers could never be permanent and effective. Once it is signed, the nuclear Powers will have to agree immediately to a significant reduction in their armaments, especially their nuclear armaments, if they do not wish to see the entire structure of the treaty inevitably crumbling." (ENDC/PV.304, para. 11)

I feel myself that to talk of immediate agreement between the nuclear Powers is to use too strong language, for the reason I sketched out earlier, but otherwise I wholeheartedly agree with Mr. Castañeda's sentiments. I do not believe that, as some people fear, the non-nuclear-weapon States will lose their bargaining power once they have signed a treaty. The text of the treaty itself -- with, as I hope, provision for a review conference -- will be a weapon of persuasion in their hands. And this persuasion is more likely to work in the atmosphere of increased détente which must follow a treaty.

16. I should now like to turn to the question of the effect of the treaty on the peaceful uses of nuclear energy. I was much impressed by the arguments of the representative of Poland in his statement at the meeting of 6 June, which -- as I am told is usual with his statements -- was sharp, short and to the point. He suggested that, because of the need to concentrate limited resources of money, material, and skilled manpower, the first casualty of a new weapons programme in any State would be that State's peaceful nuclear development programme (ENDC/PV.302, paras. 32 et seq.).

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17. He also made the point, with which I agree, that the conclusion of a non-proliferation treaty should make possible a much freer exchange of nuclear technology, materials and equipment than has been possible up to now (ibid., para. 36). Some of the nuclear-weapon Powers, particularly the United States of America, have been outstandingly generous in helping other countries to develop their civil nuclear programmes and will no doubt continue to expand their help after a treaty is signed. But the nuclear-weapon Powers which sign the treaty cannot be expected to become fairy godmothers to the world, to the complete exclusion of commercial considerations. For one thing, if they did the balance of nuclear co-operation would be upset in a way that would damage the self-respect and enterprise of States eager to develop their own industries in their own way. The conclusion of a treaty should however make it possible to remove restrictions introduced from time to time in order to inhibit the spread of nuclear weapons. This point has been recognized here in the Committee by the representatives of the other two nuclear-weapon States represented at this table. For example, in a statement on 18 May the representative of the Soviet Union, Mr. Roshchin, spoke of the effect that the treaty would have on peaceful development of nuclear energy. He said:

"Our point of view in that regard is that the solution of the non-proliferation problem is one of the most important conditions that would ensure for the non-nuclear countries the most rapid and successful development of their peaceful atomic industry." (ENDC/PV.297, para. 15)

The other co-Chairman, the representative of the United States, endorsed that statement at the meeting of 8 June (ENDC/PV.303, para. 14). My delegation fully agrees with it. I believe that some of the fears that have been expressed about this problem are exaggerated, because they are based on the wrong premises. But there is no doubt that this has been a question of acute concern, particularly to the advanced civil nuclear States.

18. Many of those States are in Western Europe, and I make no apology, as the representative of a Western European nation, for speaking now from this point of view. It has been suggested in some newspapers that my Government's support for a non-proliferation treaty has somehow been weakened by our new application to join the European Communities. I should like to take this opportunity to say unequivocally that our support for a fair and effective non-proliferation treaty remains as firm and as determined as ever. It is obvious that each member of

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this Conference and each State which proposes to sign the treaty must bear in mind the common benefit which -- as successive United Nations resolutions show -- all States acknowledge will flow from a treaty, and at the same time, in negotiating the details of the draft, must strive to protect its national interest. It is natural for my Government to look at the effect of the provisions of this treaty upon our European neighbours, particularly at a time when we hope to form part of a closer union with them in the peaceful atomic field as in other fields. The European Atomic Energy Community (EURATOM) which we have applied to join is designed to further civil nuclear development among all its members, without discrimination, and has had to take account of the fact that one member possesses nuclear weapons while the rest do not and have no intention of acquiring them. This, in microcosm, is one of the questions at issue on a world-wide scale once a non-proliferation treaty is signed.

19. It is only natural that the non-nuclear members of EURATOM, having subscribed to an international agreement not altogether dissimilar from the present treaty, at least in some of its aims and of its effects in the field of civil energy, should try to ensure that the new agreement, larger in scale, should not damage the fabric of the existing organization. It should not be forgotten that, like any international agreement, the non-proliferation treaty must take account of other existing international agreements and of the legal obligations incumbent on certain States which flow from those agreements. For instance, under the treaty establishing the European Atomic Energy Community, member countries have undertaken specific and binding obligations in connexion with their future adherence to other international agreements.

20. I do not for one moment suggest that this problem of harmonization is insoluble; I suggest only that it will not be solved by pretending that it does not exist. This does not involve a narrow regional approach; the problems of free exchange of information on advanced civil technology, of monopolies in the supply of some types of special fissionable material, of ensuring that any special advantages accruing from a weapons programme -- and in British experience these have been found to be negligible -- should be seen to be shared with others: all these problems concern civil nuclear countries all over the world as much as they do the Europeans.

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21. In conclusion, I should like to echo the sentiment which has been expressed with increasing urgency by several of my colleagues. The work on which we are engaged is of vital importance. We live in a difficult world and we are never without problems in one part of it or another. We must not allow those problems to intervene in or hold up our work here. Indeed, recent events have again underlined the need for a non-proliferation treaty and rapid progress towards general and complete disarmament.

22. We cannot go on talking around the subject much further without a text before us to get to grips with. The tabling of a draft recommended jointly by the two co-Chairmen will itself be an event of great importance, in and out of this Committee. As I suggested at our meeting of 20 June (ENDC/PV.306, para. 51), it will not be the end of our negotiations but will mark the beginning of a new and momentous stage. I hope it will be very soon and that we shall then be able at once to get down to discussing the detailed considerations that will arise.

The Conference decided to issue the following communiqué:

"The Conference of the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament today held its 307th plenary meeting in the Palais des Nations, Geneva, under the Chairmanship of H.E. Ambassador A. F. Azeredo da Silveira, representative of Brazil.

"A statement was made by the representative of the United Kingdom.

"The next meeting of the Conference will be held on Tuesday, 27 June 1967, at 10.30 a.m."

The meeting rose at 11 a.m.

CONFERENCE OF THE EIGHTEEN-NATION COMMITTEE
ON DISARMAMENT

ENDC/PV.307/Corr.1
14 July 1967
ENGLISH ONLY

THE UNIVERSITY
OF MICHIGAN

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Corrigendum

Page 7, paragraph 15, line 6 "... a treaty would result in" should read
"... a treaty which would result in"

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